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Peter O’Brien* and Andy PikeAbstract
The governance of infrastructure financing at the city and city-region scales is critical to the search for new and
innovative funding mechanisms for infrastructure systems. The global financial crisis and economic downturn have
focused attention on the role of infrastructure renewal and development in economic recovery and stimulus.
Austerity and the fiscal consolidation of public finances have reinforced government efforts to reduce expenditure
and debt, and secure private sector engagement and resources. Local actors in cities and city-regions have been
compelled into finding new sources of private and even international capital, developing innovative business
models for infrastructure provision and establishing new institutional and governance arrangements. This article
analyses the context and emergent infrastructure funding and financing approaches, models and practices being
formulated as part of a review of the City Deals in the UK. The experience of the City Deals raises critical questions
about the emergent and recombinant forms of urban leadership and governance in cities and city-regions and the
nature of centre-local relationships in the austerity state.
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In response to the global financial crisis, from 2008, the
G20 economies implemented a programme of co-ordinated
economic stimulus activity, with up to US$600 billion
invested in infrastructure (OECD 2009). However, changes
of government, coupled with rising budget deficits and
overall debt, saw several governments in 2009/10 change
tack and introduce fiscal consolidation measures in an
attempt to rebalance public finances (Donald et al. 2014).
Peck (2012) argues that fiscal consolidation or austerity
forms part an ideological blueprint where budgetary pres-
sures are used as a rationale for introducing smaller state
settlements, and where an evolving model of neo-liberal
urbanism (re)shapes the landscapes of urban economic
development and governance (see also Peck et al. 2013).
One of the features of contemporary globalisation has
been the growth of cities and city regions, but growth is un-
even and distributed across urban systems in different ways
(Barca et al. 2012). Consequently, cities represent a key site
to examine empirically the practical impacts of austerity.
Cities also provide a valuable tool for strengthening our* Correspondence: peter.o'brien@ncl.ac.uk
Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
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medium, provided the original work is properlyunderstanding of how different places are responding to
economic and fiscal crisis whilst embarking on sourcing,
managing and delivering new investment in the critical
urban infrastructure assets and systems, which are essential
for enhancing economic growth and improving quality of
life (Dawson 2013; Hall and Jonas 2014).
Infrastructure networks are the main physical and
technological assets that bind cities and city regions
together into functional economic geographies (Graham
and Marvin 2001). Since the 1970s, there has been a shift
away from integrated, bundled infrastructure networks
(Graham 2000) towards specialised, privatised and custo-
mised products. The result being that infrastructure,
which was previously viewed primarily as a ‘public good’,
has now been opened up to private and quasi-state owners
embedded within global flows of finance capital (Graham
and Marvin 2001). As the urban infrastructure landscape
has become interlinked with specialist global infrastruc-
ture funds, international actors are playing an influential
role in the governance and regulation of cities and in-
frastructure assets and systems (Torrance 2008; Pagano
and Perry 2008).
Greater collaboration between local state actors and pri-
vate interests has been evident in the material appearancess article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
y/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
credited.
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This new era has resulted in the boundaries between the
public and private sectors being recast across service
provision, infrastructure finance, delivery and operation
(Whitfield 2010). A more extensive and intensive com-
modification of space and the public sphere has followed,
accelerated by recent waves of austerity, where cities are
encouraged to adopt and embrace private sector models
of urban governance and agency (Meegan et al. 2014). As
the modus operandi of urban development and govern-
ance since the early 1980s (Davidson and Ward 2014),
speculative urbanism draws private actors and the state
together in a symbiotic process of continual negotiation
and transaction (Goldman 2011), and is framed within
a broader context whereby cities are prepared to en-
gage in riskier forms of urban development policy and
strategy (Peck et al. 2013), and formulate new territor-
ial alliances (Ward 2013). In the face of increased fiscal
constraints, and yet bound up within a pervading sys-
tem of financialisation, cities are required or compelled
to seek greater flexibility in order to demonstrate finan-
cial innovation (Harvey 1989). In terms of infrastructure
investment, this greater engagement with finance capital is
evident in the willingness and ability of local actors to bor-
row against existing assets or future revenue streams in
an attempt to stimulate or ‘unlock’ additional growth and
development.
In this article, we illustrate how the governance of local
infrastructure funding and financing has been moulded by
the broader processes of financialisation, and is evident in
the desire of governments and private investors to (re)-
define infrastructure as a new asset class. We argue that
the leveraging in of private finance, at the city and city-
region scale, is shaped by three factors. First is the nature
of the power and inter-relationships that exist in decentra-
lised and centralised systems between national and sub-
national governments. Second is the ability of places to
produce coherent strategies and prioritised delivery plans
that can attract and embed national and international pri-
vate investment. Last is the effectiveness with which public
and private institutions manage both mature and fledgling
city-region-wide governance coalitions.
The article draws upon the findings and initial analysis
of a review of the UK Coalition Government’s City Deals
programme. Between January and July 2014, 30 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with senior national
and local officials who were responsible for negotiating
and implementing City Deals, supplemented by analysis of
relevant government and other policy documents. We de-
scribe how the UK Government has invited a select num-
ber of cities to flirt with risky, speculative, complex and
potentially more expensive investment activity, only to
step back, at the eleventh hour, from agreeing to some in-
novative proposals. We argue that, despite the currentrhetoric of localism and devolution, the reluctance of
national government to sign up to some specific aspects
of City Deals is a symptom of the overly-centralised nature
of the UK political economy, and a reflection of the
overwhelming economic and political objective of the
Coalition Government to pursue fiscal consolidation and
deficit reduction.
Background: Centre-local relations and governance
The nation state has played a pivotal role in the after-
math of the global financial crisis (Dicken 2011) during
a period when longer-term, qualitative transformations
have been taking place in how the state discharges the
functions of local and regional development. Such changes
are complex, uneven and uncertain, and include forms
of territorial ‘rescaling’, and sub-national and local govern-
ments assuming additional policy and fiscal responsibilities
(Lobao and Adua 2011). We suggest, on the basis of our
research findings, that the pattern of how these develop-
ments are evolving in the UK reveal a continued tension
between centralisation and the drive for a more autono-
mous local state defined through a relationship with pri-
vate finance.
One of the more visible illustrations of state rescaling
(Pike and Tomaney 2009) has been the increase in the
number of cities and regions competing against each
other for investment, jobs and resources; based on the
uncertain premise that all places can be winners if they
follow similar market-led development and growth pol-
icies (Bristow 2010). This approach underplays, at best,
the evidence that capitalism is spatially-variegated (Peck
and Theodore 2007; Peck et al. 2013), and that contin-
gency shapes and reshapes local and regional develop-
ment policy interventions (Dicken 2011).
Our interest in the governance of local infrastructure
funding and financing stems from the uneven economic
geographies in which these processes are unfolding and
taking root as well as the specific role and function of
local and regional institutions in promoting or hindering
economic growth (Martin 2000; Rodríguez-Pose 2013;
Tomaney 2014).
Within the processes of territorial decentralisation, the
city region has emerged as a significant framework of sub-
national economic analyses and development planning
(Coombes and Champion 2011). This focus has received
additional impetus recently by the promotion of ‘Regional
Urbanisation’ (Soja 2000), ‘Metropolitan Regions’ (Katz and
Bradley 2013), and the apparent linkages between city-
region governance systems and economic performance
(Ahrend et al. 2014). Academics and policy-makers have
long been concerned that “metropolitan regions are cha-
otic and ungovernable” places (Storper 2013: 1). Often, the
planning and implementation of economic interventions at
the city-region scale requires the co-ordination of many
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ment of local institutional arrangements with functional
economic areas (Crouch 2011). The result is that local
public authorities have to spend considerable time building
and maintaining city region-wide governance and leader-
ship in order to establish effective municipal cooperation
(Ahrend and Schumann 2014; Nelles 2013).
Background: Infrastructure as an asset class and
emergent infrastructure funding and financing
practices
Faced with an increasingly influential [neo-liberal] policy
agenda (Peck et al. 2013), whose advocates argue that direct
national public borrowing and taxation should not provide
an exclusive source of infrastructure funding, and grappling
with growing (and competing) immediate demands and
pressures on local public budgets, cities are turning towards
national and international private capital for urban develop-
ment and infrastructure investment. Whilst these relation-
ships may generate potential new finance, they also pose
fundamental questions about the governance and regula-
tion of local infrastructure funding and financing.
The ability of cities and city-regions to source and de-
ploy new private capital is diverse (Peck and Theodore
2007). For example, some cities are able to mitigate the
inherent risk that certain securitised financial models
contain, whereas others lack sufficient scale, size or mar-
ket conditions to adopt and implement such complex
initiatives, and are therefore exposed to greater fiscal
stress if and when schemes fail (Weber 2010).
With traditional sources of infrastructure funding and
financing under stress, attention is turning to alternative in-
vestment mechanisms (OECD 2013). Institutional investors,Table 1 Infrastructure Financing and Funding Practices
Temporality Type Examples
Established, ‘Tried
and tested’
Taxes and fees Special assessments;
Grants Extensive range of gr
(e.g. federal national,
Debt finance General obligation bo
National Loans Funds
Tax incentives New market/historic/
Property tax relief; En
Developer fees Impact fees; Infrastruc
Platforms for institutional
investors
Pension and Insuranc
Regional infrastructur
Value capture mechanisms Tax increment financ
Infrastructure financin
Public private partnerships Private finance initiati
Design-build-operate
Asset leverage and leasing
mechanisms
Asset leasing; Instituti
Newer, ‘Innovative’ Revolving infrastructure funds Infrastructure trusts; “
Source: Adapted from Strickland, T. (2014) The financialisation of infrastructure fundincluding pension funds and insurance companies, have
been identified as new sources of infrastructure financing
(PwC 2008) as investors look to infrastructure assets as a
means of generating long-term, inflation protected returns.
A variety of urban infrastructure funding and financing
practices have emerged recently (Strickland 2014) (Table 1).
Traditionally, UK local government, which has extremely
limited fiscal autonomy in an international context (OECD
2015), has been a major recipient of infrastructure grant
funding from UK and European governments. This situ-
ation contrasts with the US, where there is a long history
of municipal borrowing from the private sector to finance
infrastructure investment. In 2008, the Core Cities Group
(at the time representing the eight largest cities in England
outside London) identified a set of financial tools that
could enable local authorities to deliver major regeneration
projects that required investment in ‘enabling’ infrastruc-
ture (Core Cities/PwC 2008). The measures included: Busi-
ness Rate Supplement; Community Infrastructure Levy;
Recycled Infrastructure Funds, Accelerated Development
Zones and Tax Increment Financing (TIF) (Table 2).
UK local authorities have undertaken prudential bor-
rowing from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) to
finance capital investment; a body administered by the
Debt Management Office, which itself is an agency of the
UK Treasury. One of the benefits of the PWLB is that it
provides simple and immediate access to finance, as the
UK Government deploys the national sovereign balance
sheet to undertake direct borrowing from international
markets on behalf of local authorities. In 2013, 75 % of
all UK local authority borrowing was provided by the
PWLB (Andersson 2014). The extent of the PWLB’s in-
fluence as a lending facility was illustrated when theUser fees and tolls; Other taxes.
ant programmes at multiple levels
province, state, supranational)
nds; Revenue bonds; Conduit bonds;
(e.g. PWLB).
housing tax credits; Tax credit bonds;
terprise Zones.
ture levies.
e infrastructure platforms; State infrastructure banks;
e companies; Real estate investment trusts; Sovereign Wealth Funds.
ing; Special assessment districts; Sales tax financing;
g districts; Community facilities districts; Accelerated development zones.
ve; Build-(own)-operate-(transfer); Build-lease-transfer;
-transfer.
onal lease model; Local asset-backed vehicles.
Earn Back” / “Gainshare” funds.
ing and financing in the UK and the US, CURDS: Newcastle University
Table 2 ‘New’ Funding Tools and Vehicles proposed by Core Cities/PwC
Tool/Vehicle Description
Business Rate Supplement A tool that will enable cities to levy an additional supplement on the national business rate within their
area. Funds generated would be retained locally, and used to underpin borrowing and other forms of
capital financing to generate additional infrastructure investment.
Community Infrastructure Levy A standard charge levied by local authorities on new development to ensure that developers contribute
to the infrastructure improvements.
Recycled Infrastructure Funds Funds that invest (in whole or in part) in physical infrastructure, which in turn enables associated land to
be released for development over time. Key infrastructure can be delivered early in the development
process. A proportion of the value of the development land released is used to pay back the Fund for its
initial investment.
Tax Increment Financing/Accelerated
Development Zones
Allows local authorities to capture incremental value in the form of tax revenue generated from new
development. Cities need to retain long-term local tax revenues generated from development, such as
business rates, allowing funds to be raised for investments through securitisation of those revenues.
Source: Core Cities/PwC (2008) Unlocking Growth: Interim Findings on New Funding Mechanisms, a report by the Core Cities Group and PwC, Manchester,
Core Cities/PwC
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in October 2010, and local authority borrowing fell by
93 % the following year (LGC 2011). This resulted in the
Local Government Associations of England and Wales
commissioning feasibility studies into the development of
a new municipal bond agency to provide local government
with an alternative source of investment finance to the
PWLB (LGA 2012).Background: The local growth agenda
In May 2010, the UK Coalition Government professed
that ‘radical devolution’ would be one of its central ob-
jectives (Cabinet Office 2010). The 2010 Local Growth
White Paper (and subsequent 2011 Localism Act) laid
the ground for the Coalition’s approach to sub-national
development in England. This agenda is framed around:
shifting power to local communities and business; enab-
ling places to tailor approaches to local circumstances;
providing incentives for growth; and supporting invest-
ment in places and people to tackle barriers to growth.
The Local Growth agenda also links geographical under-
standings about scale and place with political analysis
interpretations of decentralisation, participation, and
community and managerial approaches to efficiency and
market-orientated public service delivery (Clarke and
Cochrane 2013).
On a policy level, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs)
have replaced Regional Development Agencies in EnglandTable 3 Wave 1 and Wave 2 agreed City Deals
Wave 1 W
Greater Birmingham and Solihull Bristol and West of England Greater
Manchester Leeds City Region Liverpool City Region Nottingham
Newcastle Sheffield City Region Liverpool Mayoral Deal
Th
Pr
Po
St
Su
O
Source: Cabinet Office(Pike et al. 2013), and reforms to strategic planning
have been enacted alongside changes in local govern-
ment funding. These elements have been shaped, to
varying degrees, by the Government’s central macro-
economic objective of reducing the UK’s structural
budget deficit by implementing a fiscal consolidation
package worth £113 billion per annum over 5 years
(IFS 2014).
Public spending reductions, which comprise 80 % of
fiscal consolidation, have resulted in local government
spending fall by nearly 30 % in real terms and a tighten-
ing squeeze on revenue budgets (CIPFA 2014). A new
system of local government funding in England will see
local authorities retain 49 % of locally-raised business rate
income, with the remainder ‘passed’ to Central Govern-
ment. The new scheme – the Business Rate Retention Sys-
tem (BRRS) – will be ‘reset’ every 10 years (DCLG 2012),
and local authorities will become increasingly dependent
upon locally-generated business rate revenue for future in-
come (HoC 2013).Case Description: City deals
As a complement to the Local Growth agenda, the Coa-
lition Government has been considering the role of cities
in supporting economic recovery, rebalancing and infra-
structure planning and delivery. In parallel to its deficit re-
duction and public service reform agendas, and coupled
with a desire to adopt a ‘business-led’ relationship withave 2
e Black Country Thames Valley Berkshire Plymouth Brighton and Hove
eston and Lancashire Greater Cambridge Southampton and
rtsmouth Coventry and Warwickshire Southend Hull and Humber
oke and Staffordshire Greater Ipswich Leicester and Leicestershire
nderland and the North East Greater Norwich Swindon and Wiltshire
xford and Central Oxfordshire Tees Valley
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(with the exception of London) in England to prepare
strategies for supporting growth and job creation (using
public/private investment), and to also identify the prac-
tical measures that national government could undertake
to support delivery of the plans. Significantly, the 2011 Lo-
calism Act introduced the ‘Core Cities Amendment’, which
the Core Cities Group argued would enable individual cit-
ies to negotiate bespoke agreements with national govern-
ment on securing greater local control over public
spending, the pooling of resources across functioning eco-
nomic areas, and the planning and delivery of strategic
local infrastructure investment. This innovative approach
to urban policymaking was explained as:
The deal-making approach is in the political DNA of
Greg Clark [Cities Minister] and other Coalition
Ministers. It is about offers and making deals – a
kind of transactional relationship. The Core Cities
gave this a practical edge (Senior Ministerial Adviser,
Authors’ Interview, 2014).
Infrastructure has been a significant feature of the City
Deals (Cabinet Office 2011), which were launched in De-
cember 2011, and has emerged at a time when there has
been a noticeable shift in the UK and Europe away from
grant-based mechanisms in favour of investment-type in-
frastructure and regeneration projects and programmes
focused on loan-based revolving or recycled funds (CLES
2012). The City Deals, provide an instructive account of
how the governance of local infrastructure funding and fi-
nancing in the UK is evolving:
We want powerful, innovative cities that are able to
shape their economic destinies, boost entire regions
and get the national economy growing. The aim of
these Deals is to empower cities to forge their own
path, to play to their own strengths and to find
creative solutions to local problems (Nick Clegg,
Deputy Prime Minister, Foreword, Unlocking Growth
in Cities, 2011).
The focus of the first Deals on the 8 largest cities out-
side London (i.e. the Core Cities) (Cabinet Office 2011)
saw cities specialise in a distinctive policy area and iden-
tify a further set of specific issues that were said to rep-
resent barriers to local growth. Liverpool was unique,
compared to other cities and city regions, in that Liverpool
City Council agreed an exclusive Deal with Government,
which led to an Elected Mayoral system being introduced
by the city authority. The Liverpool City Region (including
Liverpool City Council) agreed a separate City Deal as part
of Wave 1. In October 2012, the Government invited a
further 20 cities to submit expressions of interest innegotiating City Deals, of which 18 were agreed
(Table 3). The Government proposed two elements in
the Wave 2 Deals: a bespoke element, reflecting specific
city needs; supplemented by a ‘Core Package’ of powers
that recognised some of the common challenges facing
most cities – and which had been identified earlier by
the Wave 1 cities. The UK Government also an-
nounced, around the time of the 2013 Autumn State-
ment, that a Glasgow City Deal would be taken forward
(HMT 2013).
Discussion and Evaluation: Infrastructure funding
and financing in the city deals
In an attempt to help prospective Wave 2 cities, the Gov-
ernment published a ‘menu’ of infrastructure finance-
related options for cities to consider including in their
Deals. The options were: giving cities one consolidated
capital investment pot; access to TIF; the pooling of busi-
ness rates across local authority areas; devolving local
transport major funding to cities; increasing cities’ control
over rail services; developing specific proposals for intro-
ducing greater accountability to local communities for
local bus services; enabling cities to strengthen their use of
local assets to invest economic development; devolving
Homes and Communities Agency funding and responsi-
bilities to cities; and providing £100 million for broadband
infrastructure (Cabinet Office 2011).
Each Wave 1 City Deal contains a specific infrastruc-
ture financing element (Table 4), such as an integrated
investment fund, the devolution of local transport funding,
and TIF or ‘Earn-back’ mechanisms where cities borrow
against future business rate revenue or tax receipts.
The emergence of TIF within the City Deals is linked
to the new approach to local government funding and fi-
nance in England. In their respective Deals, Newcastle,
Sheffield and Nottingham have been given ‘permission’
by Treasury to borrow up to £150 m between them
against long-term business rate income to invest in local
infrastructure and regeneration projects. Significantly,
the three City Deals do not contain a reset mechanism,
unlike the BRRS, in an attempt to provide the cities with
increased certainty around future business rate revenue.
Whilst TIF offers a potential tool for supporting local
growth, it also draws cities further into a financialised
economy (Strickland 2011; Weber 2010). Strickland
(2013) identifies a number of important differences be-
tween TIF in England and in the US, where the model
originated. He notes that Chicago has been able to
transfer risk to private developers and financiers. By
contrast, TIF in the City Deals takes development and
construction risk away from the private sector because
the costs are financed up-front by the local authorities,
which bear most of the risks.
Table 4 Infrastructure elements in the Wave 1 City Deals
Instrument City Deal Detail
‘Earnback’ Greater Manchester A payment by results infrastructure investment approach that is
based on raising GVA growth, from which Greater Manchester
earns back a return of national tax take.
Tax Increment
Financing (New
Development Deals)
Newcastle, Sheffield City Region and Nottingham Borrowing to finance critical infrastructure against future business
rates.
Economic Investment
Fund
All City Deals Pooled funding and business rates.
Rail Devolution Greater Manchester, Bristol and West of England, Leeds
City Region and Sheffield City Region
Commissioning and managing local and regional franchises.
Local Transport Major
Funding
Greater Manchester, Greater Birmingham and Solihull,
Bristol and West of England, Leeds City Region and
Sheffield City Region
10 years devolved transport funding matched locally for strategic
transport investments.
Low Carbon Pioneers Greater Birmingham and Solihull, Leeds City Region,
Greater Manchester, Newcastle and Nottingham
Local programmes to reduce carbon emissions and invest in
green infrastructure and city district heating systems.
Superfast broadband Bristol and West of England, Greater Birmingham and
Solihull, Greater Manchester, Leeds City Region and
Newcastle
£100 investment fund.
Source: Adapted from Marlow, D. (2012) City Deals – Implications for Enhanced Devolution and Local Economic Growth, Policy Briefing, London, LGiU
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Deals is the ‘Earn-back’ mechanism in the Greater
Manchester City Region. Greater Manchester will in-
vest £1.2bn through local transport levies and borrowing
in transport infrastructure and then ‘earn back’ up to
£30 m per year for 30 years from Central Government in
national tax receipt transfers, subject to Greater Manche-
ster’s economy growing above a set baseline (LFC 2013).
Negotiating the Deal took nearly two years to conclude.
This raises questions about the effectiveness and timeliness
of the deal-making process and whether sufficient capacity
national and locally exists to conduct such negotiations:
The Government’s capacity to work with 8 cities on a
meaningful basis on the devolution agenda is
stretching them. It needs resources from Central
Government and our side to make it happen. Not just
in terms of signing deals it is working through the
barriers you hit after the Deal has been signed (Local
Authority Officer in a Wave 1 City Deal, Authors’
Interview, 2014).
An interesting question is whether the Deals represent
an innovation or if they simply provide an opportunity
for existing local projects to receive Government back-
ing at a particular point in the economic cycle, thereby
reinforcing central national Government control and
providing the cities with modest additional support:
If you were using the City Deal to finance something,
which you already had on your books, which you
could convince the civil servants actually met the
criteria as they were applying them on that day, thenyou could fly out of the door on some of this (Local
Authority Officer in a Wave 1 City Deal, Authors’
Interview, 2014).
The local infrastructure financing initiatives within the
City Deals appear to have set a pattern, for the foresee-
able future, and perhaps longer, of how public funds in
the UK will be coalesced alongside an attempt to lever-
age differing forms of private investment and resources.
Further evaluation and scrutiny is required in order to
assess the ability and success of places to invest in spe-
cific projects that generate recycled funding, or are able
to bear the speculative risk of undertaking initial bor-
rowing against capturing the value of future land and
property uplift.
City deals as governance mechanisms
The City Deals are having a profound impact on the govern-
ance of urban economic development in England (Table 5).
One of the pre-requisites for Government agreeing to sign
individual City Deals has been for local authorities to take
steps to strengthen and reform local governance and
decision-making arrangements (Cabinet Office 2011):
Anybody that doesn’t have a governance structure
that will make it [the City Deal] work, isn’t getting a
City Deal (Senior Ministerial Adviser, Authors’
Interview, 2014).
The expectation of ‘stronger’ local governance has
since been re-emphasised through the recent LEP Stra-
tegic Economic Plans and Growth Deals, with Combined
Authorities or Elected Mayors at the city-regional level
Table 5 Governance mechanisms in Wave 1 City Deals
Governance
model
City Deal area Outline Description
Elected Mayor Liverpool, Bristol Mayor plus ‘strong decision-making across wider economic area’,
Skills Board (Bristol and West of England) and Transport Board
(Liverpool City Region).
Combined
Authorities
Greater Manchester, Leeds City Region, Sheffield City Region,
Liverpool City Region and North East (Newcastle)
In Leeds and Sheffield City Regions these are West Yorkshire and
South Yorkshire-based – not for whole city region/deal area but for
metropolitan unitary authorities.
LEP-led Greater Birmingham and Solihull ‘Particularly strong private sector leadership’, plus Capital Board and
Housing and Growth Board. Discussions have taken place on the
creation of a ‘Greater Birmingham’ City Region Combined Authority.
None
specified/city
council
Nottingham City Deal is focused on the City’s ‘Creative Quarter’ and a new private
sector led Economic Growth Board has been established.
Source: Adapted from Marlow, D. (2012) City Deals – Implications for Enhanced Devolution and Local Economic Growth, Policy Briefing, London, LGIU
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However, for some cities, the Government’s favoured gov-
ernance arrangements have not been viable options:
We very quickly had to say to Cabinet Office, look the
governance arrangements that were typical in Wave 1
deals were not going to work for us. So we had to
persuade the Cabinet Office that alternatives were
necessary (Local Authority Leader in a Wave 2 City
Deal, transcript of LGA debate on City Deals, 4 April
2014).
The Government pushed for Wave 2 Deals to encom-
pass wider geographies and a stronger element of com-
petition between cities (Fahnbulleh 2012). This may have
limited the scale of ambition in Wave 2 (Marlow 2014),
whilst the emergence of Local Growth Deals, based on
the recommendations of the Heseltine Growth Review
(Heseltine 2012), has also cut across some of the Wave 2
Deals as negotiations reached their conclusion in spring
2014. The principle difference between the City Deals
and Local Growth Deals is that Local Growth Deals in-
volve primarily the allocation of Local Growth Fund
monies to all 39 LEPs across England. Wave 1 and Wave
2 City Deals did not have a defined set of national re-
sources to allocate to cities and have been weighted
towards negotiating policy and fiscal freedoms and flexi-
bilities. One of the key differences between Wave 1 and
Wave 2 City Deals is how far the Government has been
willing or able, despite the initial rhetoric, to agree to genu-
ine devolutionary measures. Whereas Greater Manchester
secured the Earn-back mechanism in Wave 1, the efforts
of Greater Cambridge in Wave 2 to secure a similar ‘invest
and reward’ model, known as ‘Gain-share’, were curtailed
by Government after 15 months of negotiations:
Wave 1 was more comprehensive and probably able
to be more ambitious. The Cities Policy Unit was ableto get greater changes out of the Departments in
those early stages and by Wave 2 the Departments
had caught up and were less prone to accept radical
change (Local Authority Officer in a Wave 2 City
Deal, Authors’ Interview, 2014).
It is possible to identify a number of common features
in how the City Deals have been designed to operate as
governance mechanisms for local infrastructure funding
and financing. First, the Deals are predicated on a ‘some-
thing for something’ transactional arrangement between
the centre and a locality that is akin to a ‘payment by re-
sults’ model of public service delivery (DWP 2014). Sec-
ond, the Deals represent a move, in theory at least,
towards greater self-help and reduced reliance on central
government, with more locally-led funding, financing and
risk-bearing. Third, underpinned by cost-benefit-type ap-
praisal, the Coalition Government wants the City Deals to
demonstrate that they can support economic recovery by
delivering infrastructure and regeneration projects that
have maximum additional impact on city-region economic
potential (e.g. GVA, employment and productivity).
Fourth, the Deals have been couched as greater ‘freedoms
and flexibilities’ for local innovation. How far and how
wide this has materialised in practice is debatable. Fifth,
significant emphasis has been placed upon governance re-
forms at the city-region scale, with the Greater Manchester
Combined Authority seen as a model of good practice,
although for some cities such models are not feasible.
Finally, the Deals have been conducted against the con-
straints of austerity and fiscal stress within the UK’s highly
centralised system. Despite recent reforms to local govern-
ment funding, UK local authorities have limited fiscal free-
dom compared to cities internationally (Travers 2012).
With fiscal consolidation and deficit reduction the overrid-
ing priority, the Government has been reluctant to back
some innovative infrastructure financing mechanisms in
the City Deals (Table 5).
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The governance of infrastructure financing at the city
and city-region scales is critical to the search for new
and innovative funding mechanisms for infrastructure
systems. The UK City Deals initiative has encouraged
cities, at least initially, to consider experimental and
speculative strategies and models to finance infrastruc-
ture investment at a time of significant austerity. Echo-
ing Harvey’s (1989) identification of an entrepreneurial
urbanism, cities and city-regions in the UK have sought
to transcend public and private sector boundaries and
interests in an attempt to gain competitive advantage
and attract new investment predicated on future growth
and revenue. Such shifts are framed within the context
of emergent city region-wide governance arrangements
to cope with the decentralisation of austerity through
the enhancement of local decision-making to respond to
the financial challenges facing individual authorities.
However, local states are not simply passive, inanimate
objects in the face of international and national private
sector interests and agents (Weber 2010). Some cities
are better at engaging in urban entrepreneurial activity
than others, which itself creates and reinforces uneven
and unequal outcomes between places.
And yet the UK nation state remains pivotal to enabling
and hindering the ability of UK cities and city regions to
invest in local infrastructure. Central Government has
controlled the extent to which local authorities have been
able to use the strength of the UK’s sovereign balance
sheet to borrow for capital investment purposes. The Gov-
ernment’s public approach has been to encourage cities to
flirt with risky, complex and potentially more expensive
investment activity. However, steps have also been taken
to reduce local government borrowing from the PWLB, al-
though there has been a reversal recently of this stance.
Our review and initial analysis of the City Deals suggests
that the Government has been uncomfortable at the pro-
spect of too many cities engaging in innovative and specu-
lative activity at the same time. This illustrates the depths
to which deficit reduction remains the overriding eco-
nomic and political objective of the Coalition Govern-
ment, albeit within a proclaimed era of localism and
devolution. It also demonstrates the highly centralised na-
ture of the UK political economy.
It is too early to assess the overall performance of the
City Deals (NAO 2013), because it will be some years be-
fore the Deals produce tangible outcomes (Nathan 2011).
We can, however, offer some tentative conclusions that
the City Deals, when viewed in an international context,
and considered as a collective, do not represent radical de-
centralisation. A small number of cities have embarked
upon speculative investment to finance up-front infra-
structure, and austerity has amplified the risks these local
authorities are taking amidst a background of the squeezeof declining local revenue. However, the UK Government
has instigated a strict set of fiscal rules around mecha-
nisms, such as TIF and Earn-back.
At some point we should discover if the City Deals
represent a genuine step change from previous attempts
at sub-national devolution and governance (Ayres and
Stafford 2009). As a consequence of the Deals, city and
city-regional actors are (re)configuring their institutional,
governance and leadership arrangements in new ways to
cope with a rapidly changing and uncertain context. What
remains unclear, at this stage, is whether the UK’s highly-
centralised system is willing and able to build upon the ex-
perience of the City Deals, and embrace broader and more
permanent decentralised central-local relations.
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